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Abstract 
This paper explores the value of triggers and declarations in the management of drought, 
bringing together two disciplinary perspectives, those of the public policy scholar and 
the climate scientist. These two perspectives highlight the complexity of the develop-
ment and use of triggers in drought risk management by drawing on the experience of 
the United States, which has the most sophisticated system of drought triggers in the 
world, and that of Australia that has the most developed and longest standing national 
drought policy based on principles of risk management. The paper explores the advan-
tages and disadvantages of triggers in managing drought, concluding that triggers are 
useful risk management tools at the individual level but become problematic and can 
lead to perverse outcomes when linked to some forms of government support programs. 
Keywords: Drought, Triggers, Policy, Australia, USA 
This paper stems from several decades of inter-disciplinary collaboration be-
tween researchers in Australia and the United States on the application of a risk 
management approach to drought. The researchers have diverse backgrounds, 
but both start from a normative position that preparedness, risk management 
and mitigation are preferable approaches to managing the impact of drought 
compared to ad hoc crisis responses. One of the challenges of inter-disciplinary 
collaboration is that the authors view the problem of institutionalizing a risk 
management paradigm through different disciplinary lenses, and at times, these 
lenses raise areas of debate about the best way forward. National differences also 
affect the way we view these issues, and we have given a great deal of thought 
to how we best present these different perspectives. One such area of debate is 
the question of the use of triggers in drought policy. The (American) scientist 
in this collaboration argues that drought risk management requires relevant, 
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comprehensive, and timely information about a drought event with triggers re-
lated to severity in order to provide efficient responses for the inevitable drought 
impacts when they occur. For the (Australian) policy specialist, there are con-
cerns that some policy instruments that rely on these triggers, even when using 
the best available scientific information, can undermine the risk management 
objective and therefore produce undesirable outcomes. Indeed, Australian pol-
icy makers are currently debating changes to Australian drought policy, which 
will remove drought declarations from national policy. Australia and the United 
States provide us with two important case studies that potentially provide les-
sons for other countries. Australia is the only developed nation with a risk man-
agement-based national drought policy, and the United States is in the position 
of having the most developed and sophisticated drought monitoring system in 
the world. The ideal drought policy probably involves a combination of the two. 
This paper is an attempt to bring these different perspectives together. The 
paper is set out as follows. We begin with an explicit statement of our differ-
ent starting positions with respect to both the nature of achievable drought pol-
icy within a risk management paradigm and also a smaller, but important point 
about the focus of drought policy in Australia and the United States. At this point 
in our discussions, it became clear that our different perspectives are more based 
in the different stages of development of drought policy in our respective coun-
tries than in a fundamental disciplinary difference. This is encouraging as a small 
‘‘industry’’ has arisen in academia devoted to the issue of the interface between 
science and policy (see for example Pielke 2007) and the difficulties of speaking 
across jargon-laden disciplinary boundaries. Much of this discussion of the re-
lationship between science and policy has been in the context of the recent em-
phasis on evidence-based policy making and the different incentives and con-
straints that face researchers and policy practitioners (Botterill and Hindmoor 
accepted; Head 2010; Nutley et al. 2007; Pawson 2006). Our small example sug-
gests that sometimes differences of approach reflect different contexts rather 
than different paradigms. Our second section turns to the perspective of the US-
based scientist and makes the case for improved drought monitoring and the use 
of triggers in the US policy context. We then discuss the situation in Australia, 
the only country so far to have implemented a national drought policy based on 
the principle of risk management. This section examines the Australian experi-
ence with drought declarations and ‘‘lines on maps’’ and highlights some of the 
problems associated with declarations based on triggers when applied within a 
policy explicitly aiming to treat drought as a risk to be managed. We conclude 
with an attempt to reconcile the different perspectives and a suggestion that ef-
fective triggers and a risk management approach can coexist as long as the trig-
gers are used for risk management by individuals and not by policy makers as a 
signal to provide financial relief. 
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1 Two different perspectives 
As noted above, we began our consideration from a shared understanding of 
drought as a normal part of climate and a rejection of the ‘‘hydro-illogical cy-
cle’’ (Wilhite 1993) with its implied policy approach that drought only be the fo-
cus of attention by decision makers when it reaches some sort of ‘‘crisis’’ point. 
We sought to look at the role of triggers within this approach but very quickly 
found that the language we were employing to discuss this issue was problem-
atic. The debate over language reflected a quite fundamental difference in our 
point of departure in the consideration of drought policy, which, interestingly, is 
more a consequence of national difference than disciplinary approach. This sec-
tion seeks to set out for the reader the key point on which we differ and to set 
the context for the discussion which follows. 
1.1 The Australian context 
Australia is arguably a world leader in a risk management approach to drought. 
The idea that drought was a natural disaster was explicitly rejected over two de-
cades ago when the Australian government removed drought from the events 
covered by the country’s natural disaster relief arrangements. This is expanded 
in more detail below, but the key point for the purposes of this section is that 
the language of ‘‘crisis’’ has been rejected by Australian policy makers and the 
policy instruments used in the National Drought Policy are about risk manage-
ment across the climate cycle. There has been an element of crisis response in 
the exceptional circumstances provisions of the drought policy which provide ad-
ditional support to agricultural producers in cases of severe drought. However, 
this has been in the context of an overall approach that drought is not a disas-
ter but a risk to be managed, along with the other risks facing farm businesses, 
for example, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, commodity price fluctuations 
and outbreaks of pests and diseases. And this latter point highlights an impor-
tant second area of difference. Australian drought policy has almost exclusively 
focused on the impact of drought on agricultural producers. The programs avail-
able have focused on supporting the farm business by providing risk manage-
ment tools to assist with managing cash flow in low-income years and providing 
support to change farming practices to ‘‘drought-proof’’ farm operations. Emer-
gency measures for farm businesses have been presented in the context of sup-
porting only those operators with long-term sustainable futures in agriculture. 
As with much policy implementation, there has been a gap between the rheto-
ric and the actual impact of the policy. A recent review of the policy (Productiv-
ity Commission 2008) has made a large number of recommendations aimed at 
reinforcing the risk management message of the National Drought Policy, and 
removing those elements which have slipped back into a more crisis-response 
form. Overall, the message in Australia is that drought is not a disaster, a crisis 
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response is inappropriate and, as is discussed below, policy approaches which 
imply that drought is an ‘‘event’’ to which governments ‘‘respond’’ are inappro-
priate and inconsistent with the risk management message. 
It should also be noted that in Australia, drought policy, and water policy are 
treated separately; drought and water are handled by different government de-
partments, with different cabinet ministers and are debated within different 
policy communities. This has allowed policy makers to ‘‘firewall’’ (Thacher and 
Rein 2004) drought policy as an issue debated by a relatively small and close 
knit group of interested parties. Water policy is subject to an intergovernmen-
tal agreement between the states and the federal government and, at the time 
of writing, there is a major national debate over water allocation in the Murray-
Darling Basin. Drought is barely rating a mention in this context.1 
1.2 The US context 
Unlike Australia, the concept that drought is a natural disaster, along with other 
technological, climatological, and weather disasters, remains very strong in the 
United States. Much of the recent effort to address drought risk management has 
focused on improved drought monitoring and prediction. The implementation 
of the weekly US Drought Monitor product [http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu] in 
1999, and the active drought monitoring community that has developed around 
this effort, has helped spur tremendous progress on drought monitoring strate-
gies during the past 10 years or so. 
Movement toward a national drought policy within the United States, how-
ever, has not been able to gain similar momentum. A drought during 1995–1996 
focused national attention on the drought issue and helped lead to the passage 
of the National Drought Policy Act by US Congress in 1998, which created the 
National Drought Policy Commission (NDPC). The NDPC prepared their report 
for the US Congress in 2000, providing recommendations for a national drought 
policy. Although efforts to pass a National Drought Preparedness Act following 
the NDPC recommendations were not successful, the US Congress passed the 
National Integrated Drought Information System (NIDIS) Act in 1996 to enable 
an interagency, multi-partner approach to drought monitoring, forecasting, and 
early warning. NOAA was designated as the lead agency, and the NIDIS program 
office was established in Boulder, Colorado. 
The 1995–1996 drought event, and subsequent drought events affecting all 
regions of the United States, has highlighted that drought impacts within the 
country affect many sectors in addition to agriculture. For this reason, drought 
monitoring and response activities within the United States have developed to 
address agriculture and these other sectors (e.g., recreation and tourism, urban 
water management, energy, ecosystems, etc.), and a cross-sectoral approach is 
a part of the missions for both the NIDIS and the National Drought Mitigation 
Center (NDMC) in their drought risk management efforts. 
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Against this background, the next two sections set out two different ways of 
looking at the usefulness of triggers and declarations. These clearly reflect dif-
ferent disciplinary perspectives but they also highlight important national dif-
ferences between a more ‘‘topdown’’ government focused approach and a ‘‘bot-
tom-up’’ research driven perspective. 
2 The issue of triggers: the US scientist’s perspective 
US drought risk management focuses on the need for improved proactive strat-
egies that can be implemented before an event occurs to reduce impacts during 
future droughts and increase the timeliness and effectiveness of response (Wil-
hite et al. 2000a). In this context, drought monitoring and early warning is one 
component of a drought risk management approach. Having a monitoring/early 
warning system in place that can detect the unique characteristics of drought 
will improve drought response and lead to better drought management (Wilhite 
et al. 2000b; Mizzell 2008; Svoboda et al. 2002). Wilhite and Buchanan-Smith 
(2005) describe a drought monitoring system as the ‘‘cornerstone’’ of effective 
drought management in that decision makers require this information to im-
plement plans and policies and protect the livelihoods of citizens from the im-
pact of drought. Wilhite (2009) also describes an important feedback loop that 
occurs as drought management and drought monitoring strategies evolve: bet-
ter drought management drives a need for improved drought monitoring; im-
proved drought monitoring encourages more effective drought management. One 
reason this feedback takes place is because both improved drought monitoring 
and drought management emphasize the need for information at better spatial 
and temporal resolutions to address decisions being made at these resolutions. 
Early drought monitoring efforts tended to focus on rainfall or single indi-
cators or indices incorporating rainfall deficiencies (Heim 2002). A drought in-
dicator is a variable to monitor drought conditions, while an index is a variable 
that simplifies a more complex relationship into an indicator, such as the Palmer 
Drought Severity Index. As the need grew to make historical comparisons (se-
verity, duration, and spatial extent) of drought events, attempts were made to 
develop new indices and indicators that would capture and explain some of the 
complexities of each event (Steinemann et al. 2005). The development of the 
Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI, Palmer 1965) was an important event in 
terms of drought monitoring within the United States because of its ability to de-
pict conditions on a national scale. The PDSI was adopted for policy by a variety 
of federal drought programs, beginning in 1976 (GAO 1979; Wilhite and Rosen-
berg 1986; Heim 2002). 
As the limitations of the PDSI were recognized (Alley 1984; Heim 2002; Hayes 
et al. 1999), other indices were developed, like the Surface Water Supply Index 
(SWSI) (Shafer and Dezman 1982) and Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) 
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(McKee et al. 1993). This evolution of indicators and indices has led to the un-
derstanding that no one indicator or index can represent the diversity and com-
plexity of drought conditions across the temporal and spatial dimensions rep-
resented by the different sectors affected by drought (Hayes et al. 2005; Mizzell 
2008). In most cases, it is best to use a combination of indicators when moni-
toring drought. This option of using multiple indicators, however, can be very 
confusing for the individual decision maker, who often does not know about the 
characteristics of each indicator (Mizzell 2008). 
While a drought indicator (such as rainfall, streamflow, or the PDSI) is a vari-
able or index used to monitor drought conditions, a drought trigger is a thresh-
old value of an indicator (or multiple indicators) that activates levels of drought 
response (Steinemann 2003; Steinemann et al. 2005; Mizzell 2008). The goal of 
a trigger is to correspond appropriately to the drought characteristics identified 
by the indicator or indicators and allow decision makers operating within a cri-
sis-response framework to act in a timely and efficient manner. Without triggers 
in place, such responses to drought are often delayed or do not reach the audi-
ence the response program is intended to serve. Drought triggers can be utilized 
by individuals, municipal water systems, state officials, or federal policy mak-
ers, depending on their drought response requirements. Triggers needed for ag-
ricultural responses are going to be different from triggers needed for hydrolog-
ical or societal responses. 
Research by Steinemann (2003) and Steinemann et al. (2005) examined the 
process for establishing and evaluating drought triggers. The primary criteria 
most important to consider when selecting triggers are that they can be under-
stood by decision makers and the public (constituents of the policy), are scien-
tific and objective, and can be evaluated for their effectiveness in terms of relat-
ing drought severity with impacts. Trigger characteristics include the indicator 
value, time period, spatial scale, probabilities of occurrence, and perhaps distin-
guishing whether a drought is increasing or decreasing in severity (Steinemann 
et al. 2005). If triggers are going to be implemented in policy or management 
decisions, they need to be consistent from event to event and equitable in terms 
of the people affected (Steinemann et al. 2005). 
Steinemann et al. (2005) examined state-level drought plans and feedback 
from water managers in the United States to determine criteria for the opera-
tional use of drought indicators and triggers in this particular sector. These cri-
teria included suitability of indicator and trigger for the particular drought type; 
data availability and consistency; clarity and validity; temporally and spatially 
sensitive; temporally and spatially specific; drought progressing and receding; 
statistical consistency; links with program goals and management; explicit com-
bination methods; and quantitative and qualitative indicators. Keyantash and 
Dracup (2002) identified similar criteria during an evaluation of drought in-
dicators in their study of two climate divisions in Oregon. Mizzell’s (2008) re-
cent assessment highlights the fact that many indicators and triggers are still 
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being developed and used without ‘‘scientific justification’’. Therefore, the need 
still remains within the United States for a thorough evaluation to help better 
determine which trigger or triggers are most relevant and responsive for vari-
ous applications. 
Policy makers in the United States have recognized the need for balance 
between risk management and drought relief programs. The NDPC Report 
(2000), for example, emphasized the following guiding principle for a na-
tional drought policy: ‘‘Favor preparedness over insurance, insurance over re-
lief, and incentives over regulation’’. Even so, a variety of relief programs re-
main embedded within US agricultural policy, and many of these programs, 
as well as insurance programs rely on some type of trigger for implementa-
tion. Several of these programs, for example, rely on the US Drought Monitor 
product as their trigger. As a result, the focus on improved drought monitor-
ing and early warning strategies, as described above, has provided a scientific 
foundation for these programs. 
3 Triggers as a problem for policy: the experience of Australia 
Australia is the driest inhabited continent with one of the most variable climates 
on the planet due to not only annual variability in rainfall found in many places 
in the world but also multi-annual variability arising from the ENSO system 
and inter-decadal variability originating in the oceans (Hennessy et al. 2008, 3; 
Lindesay 2003; Stafford Smith 2003, 10–11). Drought has been an ongoing prob-
lem since the arrival of European settlers in the late eighteenth century and the 
introduction of agricultural practices that had evolved in a more benign and re-
liable climate. Stafford Smith (2003, 11) sums up this challenge of the Austra-
lian landscape as follows: 
Plants living in the US (or Mediterranean) environments can be rea-
sonably confident that they will receive another rainfall of a given size 
with a consistent return time, usually less than a year. By comparison, 
the Australian plant (speaking telelogically!) has no idea when its next 
drink is going to fall. 
This statement is significant in the agricultural context as the crops cultivated 
by Australian agricultural producers originated in Europe and European settlers 
brought with them a conception of climate that regarded droughts, and indeed 
floods, as a deviation from a more reliable norm, not as a characteristic of the 
climate to which they would need to adapt. Over the past 200 years, Australia’s 
farmers have been highly innovative and are today among the most productive 
in the world, adapting to the often harsh climate and challenging conditions of 
farming an ancient landscape. 
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Until 1989, drought was considered a natural disaster and the federal and state 
governments responded within the framework of the natural disaster relief ar-
rangements (NDRA), an agreement which still sets out the respective responsi-
bilities of the two levels of government in the event of disasters such as cyclones, 
earthquakes, bushfires, and floods. In 1989, the federal government announced 
that drought was no longer to be covered by the NDRA. There were several reasons 
for this decision, one of which was the increasing understanding of the impact of 
the El Ninõ-Southern Oscillation phenomenon on Australian rainfall, particularly 
in the eastern states. Policy makers were of the view that improved scientific un-
derstanding of Australia’s climate patterns meant that it was no longer tenable to 
base policy on a position that drought was entirely unpredictable and surprising to 
the same degree as other events covered by NDRA. Drought of some severity will 
occur in Australia; the challenge is that its timing is unknown. This suggests that 
the best approach is to provide farmers, again reflecting the Australian drought 
policy emphasis on agriculture, with the tools to manage their businesses to cope 
with the downturn in production and income that accompanies a prolonged dry 
spell. These tools can be in the form of skills training, financial management in-
struments, or climate information to help in business planning. 
Following the removal of drought from NDRA, a Drought Policy Review Task 
Force (DPRTF) was set up in 1990 to: 
1. identify policy options which encourage primary producers and other seg-
ments of rural Australia to adopt self-reliant approaches to the management 
of drought; 
2. consider the integration of drought policy with other relevant policy issues; 
and 
3. advise on priorities for Commonwealth Government action in minimizing 
the effects of drought in the rural sector. (DPRTF 1990, 2) 
The Task Force report argued that ‘‘Managing for drought is about managing for 
the risks involved in carrying out an agricultural business, given the variabil-
ity of climate. Drought represents the continuing risk that seasonal conditions 
will not be adequate to sustain agricultural activity’’ (DPRTF 1990, 3). Following 
receipt of the Task Force recommendations, the federal and state governments 
agreed to a National Drought Policy based on ‘‘principles of sustainable develop-
ment, risk management, productivity growth, and structural adjustment in the 
farm sector’’. Its objectives were to: 
• encourage primary producers and other sections of rural Australia to adopt 
self-reliant approaches to managing for climate variability; 
• facilitate the maintenance and protection of Australia’s agricultural and envi-
ronmental resource base during periods of climate stress; and 
• facilitate the early recovery of agricultural and rural industries, consistent 
with long-term sustainable levels. (ACANZ 1992, 13). 
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The 1992 National Drought Policy made a distinction between ‘‘normal’’ and ‘‘se-
vere’’ drought, with the latter being droughts for which even the best farm man-
ager could not be expected to prepare. Such events were known as ‘‘exceptional 
circumstances’’ (EC). The policy came into effect on January 1, 1993, and the EC 
provisions were triggered almost immediately and came quickly to dominate the 
implementation of the drought policy. The timing of the introduction of the new 
risk management approach was unfortunate for policy makers as it coincided 
with what was at the time considered to be the worst drought of the twentieth 
century. It was also a problem for policy makers that exceptional circumstances 
had not been defined adequately in the relevant legislation, so almost immedi-
ately there was debate around how such events would be identified. As the dec-
laration of EC triggered government relief in the form of enhanced subsidies on 
interest payable on commercial loans and, later, increasingly generous welfare 
payments, the criteria used for the declarations were highly contested. This de-
bate over the triggers shifted attention away from managing the risk of drought 
to managing the parameters of the policy and shifted the energies of farmers 
from adapting to climate variability to making the case that they satisfied the 
requirements for assistance. The first attempt to develop an objective, scientif-
ically based system for declaring EC drought was the result of a Workshop in 
1994. This was endorsed by the Ministers in the form of six core criteria, which 
would be taken into account in considering exceptional circumstances declara-
tions. These criteria were as follows: 
1. meteorological conditions; 
2. agronomic and stock conditions; 
3. water supplies; 
4. environmental impacts; 
5. farm income levels; and 
6. scale of the event. (ARMCANZ 1994, 3) 
The framework specified that a rare and severe drought was a ‘‘once-in-a-gen-
eration’’ circumstance (ARMCANZ 1994, 8), taken to mean a one in twenty to 
twenty-five year occurrence (O’Meagher et al. 2000, 121), with the meteorologi-
cal situation as the threshold event. This did not end debate over drought policy 
or its implementation. Although the underlying principle of risk management 
remained, the criteria for EC declarations, and even which should be the thresh-
old criterion continued to be the subject of debate over the ensuing decade (for 
more detail on the various reviews and debates around declaration criteria see 
Botterill 2003b). 
Apart from generating debate about the appropriate criteria for triggering an 
EC declaration, the scheme was plagued from the outset by what became known 
as the ‘‘lines on maps problem’’. The areas subject to EC declarations were geo-
graphically defined, usually on the basis of existing administrative boundaries. 
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This meant that not only did the boundaries rarely, if ever, align with meaning-
ful biophysical regions, but they also raised inequities with those experiencing 
similar conditions on the ‘‘wrong side’’ of the lines. Attempts were made to ad-
dress this through the introduction of buffer zones in 2001 but as has been noted 
elsewhere this ‘‘simply blurred the lines rather than addressing the inequity’’ 
(Botterill 2003a, 55). 
For the purposes of this discussion, the important point is that Australian gov-
ernments have been committed since 1992 to basing drought policy on the prin-
ciple of risk management. The rhetoric of successive ministers for agriculture, 
from both sides of Australian politics, has continued to reinforce the risk man-
agement message. However, the implementation of the EC provisions has to a 
large extent undermined that objective. Attempts to produce objective criteria 
for the declaration process have been unsuccessful, and the regular reconsider-
ation of those criteria has left a clear impression that they are open for negoti-
ation, and therefore the result of a political process rather than based on scien-
tific evidence. The declaration process itself has provided several access points 
for those trying to make the case that the circumstances they are experienc-
ing are exceptional and this has diverted the efforts of groups of farmers away 
from managing their farm businesses in the face of increasing dryness to lobby-
ing to receive government support. The key components of the drought policy 
package, described below, hinge on the declaration that an exceptional circum-
stances (EC) drought exists in a defined area. A case needs to be made, first by 
those affected, and then by the relevant State government, that the definition of 
EC has been met and that support is therefore justified. This process of prepar-
ing an EC case is time-consuming and requires evidence to be collected, poten-
tially diverting farmers’ efforts from other, risk management, activities. A recent 
inquiry into the EC program by the Australian government’s economic research 
agency, the Productivity Commission (2008, 133) summed up problems within 
the drought policy’s implementation as follows: 
Some government programs for drought assistance have had con-
sequences that are perverse to the objectives of the NDP [National 
Drought Policy] and inconsistent with the outcomes of other pro-
grams. This can limit the effectiveness of NDP and broader agricul-
tural policies. Business assistance programs, including EC interest 
rate subsidies and subsidies for other business inputs, such as trans-
port, water, or irrigation infrastructure, can support some farmers 
and small businesses who may not have made wise management de-
cisions and are consequently not self-reliant during droughts. Such 
programs provide an incentive for some farms to structure their ex-
penditure and debt to maximize their receipt of government subsi-
dies for business costs. 
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The Commission (133) notes that 
Furthermore, these programs can discourage drought preparedness ac-
tions such as early destocking or diversification of income sources and 
distort production decisions by leading farms to use the subsidized in-
put in excess of what would otherwise be the case. (2008, 133) 
The government programs on offer under the EC program, which are quite lim-
ited both in scope and generosity by international standards, have had mixed 
success in conveying the risk management message. There are three key pro-
grams that have comprised the EC response: 
1. Subsidies on the interest payable on commercial loans 
2. An EC welfare payment 
3. Farm Management Deposits 
Interest rate subsidies have been used as a policy instrument in agricultural ad-
justment policy in Australia for decades and have been subject to ongoing crit-
icism. A number of government reports has recommended against them (Syn-
apse Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992; McColl et al. 1997). They are considered 
inequitable and poorly targeted and run the risk of encouraging farmers to take 
on more debt than sound risk management would suggest is appropriate. The 
second component of the package, the welfare payment, has become increas-
ingly generous over its lifetime, opening up real inequities between farmers, 
and between farmers and other groups in the community (Botterill 2007). Both 
of these programs have been triggered by the declaration of the existence of an 
exceptional circumstance and are subject to the lines on maps problem. This is 
particularly problematic for the welfare program as it means that the personal 
circumstances of the recipient are not the threshold eligibility criterion for in-
come support. 
The third program, the Farm Management Deposits scheme, has been the 
most successful in terms of the risk management paradigm. It is a tax effec-
tive income-smoothing mechanism that allows farmers to put aside money in 
good years to be drawn on in subsequent bad years. The Productivity Commis-
sion (2008, 159) found that this scheme provides a ‘‘relatively effective form of 
assistance for primary producers that potentially assists in building a self-reli-
ant platform for drought preparedness through incentives to maintain finan-
cial reserves’’. The Commission also noted that ‘‘Importantly, availability of the 
scheme is not dependent on drought declaration, location or farm type’’ (2008, 
160). Not surprisingly, given these assessments, the Commission recommended 
that the interest rate subsidy program be abolished, the welfare program be re-
placed with a scheme that is not linked to a declaration process, and the Farm 
Management Deposit scheme be retained. The important policy point here is that 
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the most successful part of the National Drought Policy implementation is that 
which does not require declarations or triggers. It is a standing program which 
farmers use as an income-smoothing mechanism as part of their risk manage-
ment strategy for their business. This makes it absolutely consistent with the 
spirit of the Australian policy approach to drought. 
The Australian government has yet to respond in full to the Productivity Com-
mission report, or the other two reports which were also part of the review pro-
cess (Drought Policy Review Expert Social Panel 2008; Hennessy et al. 2008). A 
trial of alternative drought support measures was run in cooperation with the 
Western Australian government in that state for 2 years until June 2012. A report 
on the trial found that it had ‘‘been implemented as intended’’ and it ‘‘noted the 
strong demand for the pilot programs’’ (Keogh et al. 2011, 1). At the time of writ-
ing, no area of Australia is experiencing exceptional circumstances drought con-
ditions and governments have yet to indicate the content of future drought policy. 
The types of problems experienced in implementing the risk management ap-
proach in Australia are indicative of the essentially political nature of all policy 
processes. The frustrated dream of many to ‘‘take the politics out’’ of the pro-
cess is unrealistic. All policy making involves judgement, which by its very na-
ture is political, at least in the small ‘‘p’’ sense of being about balancing com-
peting values at play in the decision-making process (Easton 1953, 129; Stewart 
2009). The EC interest rate subsidy program and welfare program provide mon-
etary incentives to farmers and their representatives to ‘‘game’’ the declaration 
process and as such, provide a disincentive to practice sound risk management. 
The focus then becomes the declaration process itself, not the risk management 
message. Programs like the Farm Management Deposits scheme, and other in-
come-smoothing mechanisms like revenue contingent loans (Botterill and Chap-
man 2009), are much better risk management tools than declaration-linked pro-
grams. The lesson from nearly two decades of drought policy in Australia is that 
drought declarations that are tied to agricultural support programs become po-
liticized and contested. They undermine the risk management message and may 
provide disincentives to good management practice. 
Australia’s experience with the EC program would suggest that, from a po-
litical and policy perspective, drought declarations which trigger government 
support are problematic. They are hard to define, they are susceptible to lobby-
ing, and they have the potential to undermine the risk management message of 
the National Drought Policy. However, it is an open question as to whether the 
problem is with triggers and declarations per se, or whether Australia’s unhappy 
experience with EC declarations has been due to the unsophisticated and fluid 
nature of the criteria that have been employed. It is also important to make the 
distinction between the triggering of government support and the use of triggers 
by individual managers to inform their risk management decisions. 
As noted above, the implementation of Australia’s ‘‘exceptional circumstances’’ 
program preceded the development of the declaration process so, from the outset, 
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the question of how an exceptional circumstances area was to be identified was 
problematic. The process was largely ‘‘top-down’’ with little consultation with 
stakeholders about the criteria to be employed. The body tasked with recom-
mending EC declarations visits areas which have applied for such a declara-
tion, but there is not the level of stakeholder engagement that occurs with the 
US Drought Monitor and which involves stakeholders in monitoring conditions 
on an ongoing basis. 
4 Recommendations for the development and use of triggers 
There are some clear value judgements here which form the basis of our argument. 
First, we argue that drought policy should be based in a recognition that drought 
is a normal part of climate and is best addressed in a framework of mitigation and 
risk management. Second, we consider that a ‘‘good’’ trigger has stakeholder buy-
in, is comprehensive, and involves a transparent process that engages a range of 
disciplinary expertise. On this basis, the ‘‘ideal’’ drought policy would incorporate 
detailed monitoring of drought conditions combined with ongoing government pro-
grams that support risk management. Triggers would serve the purpose of provid-
ing individual managers with timely and reliable information about drought con-
ditions, which would inform their risk management decisions. 
The present situation with respect to Australia is that its experience with un-
sophisticated triggers linked to financial support has resulted in a rejection of EC 
declarations by the Productivity Commission (2008) and more recently by poli-
ticians (PIMC 2011). At the time of writing, Australian federal and state govern-
ments were negotiating a revised National Drought Policy based on principles 
which explicitly reject the use of declarations. This does not necessarily mean 
that the identification of changing drought conditions through a system simi-
lar to the US Drought Monitor has been ruled out, but it implies that govern-
ment support would be ongoing. The introduction of a Drought Monitor or sim-
ilar in Australia would need to be managed carefully to ensure that it was seen 
as a tool for individual business managers rather than as a declaration mecha-
nism for governments. 
In the United States, in spite of very severe droughts across the southern 
Plains and Southeast recently, there remains little momentum for the develop-
ment of a cohesive national drought policy. Recent calls for a national policy have 
not made headway, and an effort to create a National Drought Council as part of 
the 2008 US Farm Bill was not successful (Folger et al. 2010; Kimery 2012). For 
now, it appears that the emphasis at the federal level will remain focused on NI-
DIS, and the efforts NIDIS is leading in the areas of monitoring, prediction, and 
supporting regional drought early warning systems. 
Finally, both nations will have to deal with the issues of drought triggers and 
policies within a context of future climate change. Because of the similarities in 
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their slow onset and long-lasting characteristics, risk management approaches 
for drought and climate change are likely to be mutually beneficial. Drought 
risk management strategies involving triggers and policies will naturally serve 
in the preparation for climate change impacts. Likewise, climate change adap-
tation strategies supporting sustainability and resiliency will reduce risk associ-
ated with natural disasters including droughts. 
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